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The "New" Presumption Against Preemption
MARY J. DAVIS*
Is there or isn't there a "presumption against preemption"? The Supreme Court
continues to mention it, but then does, or does not, apply it in a way that helps us
understand what it is. This Article explores the Court's preemption opinions in the last
several decades, particularly its most recent pronouncements, and concludes that,
indeed, there is a presumption against preemption. It is a "new" presumption in the
sense that it is born of the Court's active preemption docket in the last two decades,
which has more narrowly defined both express and implied preemption analysis. The
"new" presumption is stronger in express preemption cases, operating as a true default
rule in the absence of clear and manifest congressional intent to preempt, but is less
rigid, or, in other words, more forgiving in implied preemption cases, giving breathing
room to the definition of actual conflict while maintaining focus on articulated
congressional objectives.
The uncertain course of preemption doctrine in the last two decades has contributed to
a substantial increase in preemption arguments being made that perhaps never should
have been made. The Court opened the door to many of those arguments by its display
of uncertainty over the place of the presumption against preemption. The Court may
have closed that door by its recent preemption decisions that clarify the importance of
the presumption against preemption in both express and implied preemption cases.
This Article explains the "new" presumption against preemption that has resulted, and
hopes to reduce the current uncertainty over the role of the presumption in preemption
doctrine.
* Associate Dean for Administration and Faculty Development, Stites & Harbison Professor of
Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. Research for this Article was originally conducted for,
and an earlier version presented to, the Pound Institute for Civil Justice, Forum for State Appellate
Court Judges, in July 2oo9. Thanks to Professor Catherine Sharkey for her helpful comments on an
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Is there a presumption against federal preemption of state law? The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution declares that "the
Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land,"' a
fairly "no frills" statement. To respond to the inevitable doubt about
what "supreme" means in the face of the wide variety of federal
legislation, the Supreme Court has defined a framework to give content
to the Supremacy Clause. That framework, known as preemption
doctrine, centers on a search for congressional intent to preempt.
Within the search for congressional intent to preempt, the Supreme
Court has recognized the historic role of state law and paid homage to
I. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; .. . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
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the role of the states in our federal system of government.' That homage
comes in part in the form of a "presumption against preemption." This
"presumption" is often stated as follows:
[J]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress
has "legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied," . . . we "start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
The Supreme Court has mentioned this presumption on many occasions.4
But just as frequently, the Court has decided cases involving preemption
and never mentioned the presumption.5
State laws are, of course, as various as federal laws. The main focus
of this Article, and of the many Supreme Court cases in the last two
decades,6  will be federal preemption of state common law damages
actions. An example drawn from products liability, a subject which has
been the center of many of the Court's preemption decisions in the past
two decades, will illustrate: Assume Congress has legislated to impose its
solution to a perceived problem, for example, consumer protection
legislation. Congress has created an administrative body to implement its
solution; in our example, it would be the Consumer Product Safety
Commission.7 Congress charges that agency with promulgating
2. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2ooo) (discussing history of the Supremacy
Clause and its meaning).
3. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009) (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
This "presumption" has been part of preemption jurisprudence for almost one hundred years.
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 155-58 (1917). Much has been written on the
presumption. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption Against Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV.
967 (2002) [hereinafter Davis, Unmasking the Presumption]; Richard Nagareda, FDA Preemption:
When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, i J. TORT L. (2oo6), http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voli/
issI/art4/; Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-Emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-Emption
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 4o ARiz. L. REV. 1380 (1998); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 454 (2008); Sandra Zellmer,
Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1666-72 (2009).
Most commentators favor such a presumption as consistent with fundamental notions of
concurrent federal and state authority in our federal system of government. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis,
The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. Io89, 1141-44
(2007) [hereinafter Davis, Implied Presumption]; Raeker-Jordan, supra, at 1428-29; Nelson, supra
note 2, at 290. But see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEo. L.J. 2085, 2112-17
(2000) (criticizing the presumption against preemption).
4. See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 3 (chronicling one hundred years of
Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence and references to the presumption against preemption).
5. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2oo8); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861 (2ooo).
6. See generully Mary J. Davis, On Restating Products Liability Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. Ray.
759, 762 (2009) (noting recent Supreme Court focus on preemption of state tort laws).
7. The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), which is the basis for this example, can be found
at I5 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2082 (2006 &c Supp. 2008). The CPSA was originally enacted in 1972, see Pub. L.
May 2olo] I219
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regulations to implement the legislation. Until Congress entered the
field, however, the perceived problem was addressed, if at all, by state
law. How does one tell, under the Supremacy Clause, whether those state
laws continue to operate once Congress and its delegated agency have
entered the field? Is all state law displaced under the Supremacy Clause
regardless of how it operates, even if it complements the federal
legislative and regulatory scheme? Where there is overlap, what state law
survives and what state law is defeated?
In the one hundred plus years that the Supreme Court has
addressed preemption issues, it has been inconsistent about the role that
the presumption against preemption plays. Most recently, the Court, in
Wyeth v. Levine, reaffirmed the existence of the presumption against
preemption in a case asking whether a common law damages action
alleging failure to warn regarding a prescription pharmaceutical was
impliedly preempted by a federal Food and Drug Administration
approval of the product's warning label.8 In the immediately preceding
term, however, the Court decided an express preemption problem,
whether a common law damages action alleging design defect based on a
federally approved medical device was preempted, without mentioning
the presumption at all.'
This Article will identify a trend in Supreme Court preemption
cases that can be fairly said to define a "new" presumption against
preemption. The "new" presumption is more than a platitude. It plays an
important, foundational role in express preemption cases in which
Congress's words are central to defining preemptive intent but are
considered against the backdrop of the presumption. The presumption
has substantial impact in express preemption cases as a meaningful
default rule in the absence of congressional clarity. The "new"
presumption also brings clarity to implied conflict preemption analysis by
informing the construction of the relevant conflict. How the "new"
presumption operates in preemption analysis, what its limitations are,
and how it will limit the aggressive use of preemption doctrine to restrict
state law claims is the subject of the remainder of this Article.
I. THE BASIC PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK: SITUATING THE PRESUMPTION
The Supreme Court has long held that federal laws preempt state
laws if, first and foremost, that is Congress's clear and manifest intent:
"The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-
emption case.""' Preemption doctrine begins with the assumption that
No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, and was substantially amended in 2008.
8. 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009). Levine is discussed in more detail infra Part III.
9. See Riegel. Ix28 S. Ct. 999.
io. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see also Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (stating that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
[Vol. 61:1I2171 220
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Congress has the power to define the scope of its legislation. Sometimes
Congress defines its intent expressly by including in legislation a
provision that addresses the legislation's preemptive scope. When that is
the case, the preemption provision must be evaluated to determine
Congress's intent. As with any legislative provision, the words used are
often not clear when applied to situations presented months and years
later. Express preemption provisions must be interpreted. A variety of
interpretive tools exist to determine congressional intent, including an
evaluation of the ordinary meaning of the terms of the statute, its
structure, and its purpose as discerned through the legislative history."
When Congress has not expressed its preemptive intent, the
Supreme Court has identified two basic doctrines that imply that intent
and act as a substitute for Congress's express intent to preempt. These
implied preemption doctrines substitute for express intent a judicial
determination of what Congress would have intended on the facts
presented. The two categories are: (i) "occupation of the field" implied
preemption, where Congress has legislated so comprehensively in a field
that it must have intended national uniformity of regulation, and,
therefore, its legislation displaces all state regulation;" and (2) "implied
conflict preemption," where the federal and state regulations are in such
actual conflict that state law must yield to the federal because either (a)
federal and state provisions directly conflict so that it is impossible for a
person to comply with both requirements, or (b) state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."[3
Implied conflict preemption in its "obstacle" form is exceedingly
important because it has the potential to be broadly applied; after all,
federal and state objectives are in the eye of the beholder. Justice
Thomas has strongly criticized implied obstacle preemption for that
reason.14 Defining the scope of express congressional intent to preempt
touchstone" in preemption analysis).
Ii. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2oo8); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). For further discussion of determining congressional intent to preempt, see
infra Part II.D.
12. For a discussion of occupation of the field preemption, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW § 14.4, at 942 (2d rev. ed. 2oo8). Accord THOMAS 0. McGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR
109, 264-65 (2oo8) ("The Supreme Court has applied field preemption sparingly to state common law
claims, and the lower courts have followed suit."). The Supreme Court has rarely found Congress to
have impliedly occupied a field. But see United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (finding field
preemption of state regulation of oil tankers). Because of its relative rarity to date as a significant facet
of preemption doctrine, field preemption will not be discussed in detail in this Article. Some have
advocated its use in certain limited contexts, however. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field
Preernption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 463 (2uo9).
33. OWEN, supra note 12, at 942 n.3o (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 ('941)).
14. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 5. Ct. I187, 12o4 17 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing against any form of obstacle preemption as contrary to federalism principles); see
May 2010] I221
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and implementing implied conflict preemption doctrines have proved to
be extremely difficult and lead to widely varying opinions, as the Court's
preemption cases in the last twenty years attest. Both often require
judges to cut at the joint between competing methods of statutory
interpretation and overlapping definitions of federal and state objectives.
Implied obstacle conflict preemption doctrine has been the most difficult
for courts to apply because of the inherent uncertainty in determining
Congress's intent to preempt based on an ex post judicial assessment of
congressional objectives. A "presumption against preemption" would be
an important tool in applying both types of preemption doctrine and
would aid in the resolution of cases on the margins. Its existence as a
default rule is important in the most difficult cases.
In a prior article, I chronicled one hundred years of preemption
doctrine history and the application of the presumption against
preemption in particular." After reviewing the cases, and exploring the
twists and turns in the Court's modem preemption cases, it appeared to
me that the presumption against preemption was little more than a
platitude for the Court to mention before moving with dispatch to find
preemption in circumstances when it traditionally had not.6 While the
Court has recently reaffirmed the presumption against preemption in
Levine," it is unclear whether my earlier conclusion needs revision. The
Court's modern preemption decisions lack the clarity that one would
have hoped would be produced by so much opinion writing. The Court's
recent cases have alternated between express and implied preemption
analysis and have inconsistently used the presumption in that analysis.
Three cases decided in 2oo8 and 2oo9 reiterate some basic tenets of the
doctrine," and, while the preemption landscape continues to be difficult
terrain, a "new" presumption, more narrowly focused and thus more
effective, can be identified. 9
Also important in the birth of the "new" presumption is the effect of
the 2oo8 presidential election, which produced a change not only in the
White House but also in the federal government's position on
preemption.20 That change limits the circumstances in which federal
also Nelson, supra note 2, at 277 (stating that obstacle preemption requires "imaginative
reconstruction" of congressional intent).
15. See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 3.
16. Id. at 1014-21.
17. 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (noting that preemption analysis is guided by "two cornerstones," one of
which is the presumption against preemption).
18. Id.; Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2oo8); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999
(2oo8).
89. See Altria Group, 129 5. Ct. at 538; Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 86i (2ooo);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 5r8 U.S. 470 (8996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 50 U.S. 504 (1992).
20. Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 24,693 (May 2o, 2009) ("The purpose of this memorandum is to state the general policy of my
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government agencies within the executive branch are to advance a
preemption position. As such, the policy change will affect whether the
federal government takes a position on preemption in any particular
piece of litigation1 and, in doing so, may slow the evolutionary speed of
preemption doctrine that has occurred in the last twenty years. It may
also affect the content of the doctrine just as the preceding
administration's aggressive advocacy for preemption spurred more cases
that led to decisions favoring preemption.
The pace of preemption cases in the last twenty years, in
combination with a renewed government position advocating restraint in
seeking preemption, solidify what I am calling the "new" presumption
against preemption. The "new" presumption operates against the
backdrop of a political climate that, at times, may favor or disfavor
preemption as a means of strengthening federal control over a subject.
Ultimately, the "new" presumption confirms that it is Congress that has
the final word and, absent clarity from Congress, the "new" presumption
will operate as a meaningful default rule in express preemption cases. In
cases of implied conflict preemption, where loose notions of "objectives"
and "purposes" cause concern among those who favor both limited
judicial intervention and limited federal control over traditionally state-
governed subjects, the "new" presumption acts as one factor in
constructing an actual conflict that will serve to defeat state law. The
balance struck by the "new" presumption against preemption may bring
stability to preemption doctrine, which continues as a most important
doctrine determining the relationship between federal and state
governments, particularly in this era of rapid federal government
expansion.
The following Part provides a brief synopsis of the history of the
presumption against preemption, describes its modern treatment by the
Administration that preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be
undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a
sufficient legal basis for preemption.").
21. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2oo8), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2oo9)
(vacating in light of Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187). In response to Levine, the United States withdrew as
amicus in Colacicco and notified the Third Circuit that the United States "does not take a position on
whether [the state-law failure-to-warn claims] are preempted" and "has not yet conducted the sort of
reexamination of various preemption issues following the Supreme Court's decision in [Levine] that
would be necessary to inform a position of the United States in this case." Letter from Sharon Swingle,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals (Apr. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.ahrp.org/cms/index2.php?option=com content&do-pdf=i&id=583.
22. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization
of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. Ray. 227 (2007) (chronicling the recent trend of federal agencies issuing
statements supporting preemption); see also Davis, Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at lo94-96




Court, and explains the current state of the presumption. Part III will
explain the "new" presumption against preemption.
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. FOUNDATIONAL CASES ESTABLISHING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
PREEMPTION
Several cases from the mid-twentieth century set the stage for
modern preemption doctrine. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., the
Court emphasized the centrality of discerning congressional intent to
preempt and defined the presumption against preemption which is
quoted today: when Congress has legislated in a field that the states have
traditionally occupied, "we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."23 Rice
involved application of the Federal Warehouse Act, which, though
originally leaving state regulation intact, had been amended to provide
the Secretary of Agriculture with "exclusive authority" to license federal
warehouses.24 Plaintiff challenged a variety of Illinois warehousing
regulations, most of which did not directly conflict with federal
regulations, but, rather, were more comprehensive than the federal
counterpart."
The Court defined the ways in which Congress's "clear and manifest
purpose" might be evidenced. The Court noted that if the federal scheme
is pervasive, leaving states no room to supplement it, or the federal
legislation involves a field dominated by the federal interest, Congress
must have intended to preclude state laws on the same subject, leading to
what has been referred to as "field preemption. 6 Finding no dominant
federal interest or pervasive federal scheme of regulation, the Court
applied a third method of discerning congressional intent: whether state
policy is inconsistent with federal objectives." To make that assessment,
the Court reviewed the statute's terms and its particular history and
found that Congress had intended to displace state regulation entirely in
the field even though many areas had been left unregulated by federal
legislation.2"
23. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
24. See Ch. 13, 39 Stat. 486 (1916) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-256 (2oo6)); see also
Rice, 331 U.S. at 223-24.
25. Rice, 331 U.S. at 224-29 (including such matters as rates, discrimination, mixing grain, and
maintenance of elevators).
26. Id. at 230 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (x94x) (federal immigration laws); N.Y.
Gent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (railroad regulations)).
27. Id. at 230, 232.
28. Id. at 234-35.
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Rice relied on statutory interpretation, statutory scope, and
legislative history to discern the clear and manifest congressional intent
to overcome the presumption against preemption. Rice involved implied
preemption of a very specific state business regulation-warehouse
licensing requirements. In San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, the Court was faced with a different situation: the application
of implied preemption doctrine to state common law damages actions
and their effect on federal labor laws.29 In Garmon, employers claimed to
have been injured by the nonviolent picketing of labor activists.30 They
sued the activists for damages under state tort law, and the activists
argued that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted the
state tort causes of action." The NLRA clearly left room for the states to
regulate matters not governed by the federal scheme, so the Court had to
determine whether state tort actions survived the federal scheme." The
labor activists sought to use preemption as a shield to protect their right
to speak freely to educate their fellow workers and encourage
organization.33
The Court, applying implied conflict preemption,34 did not speak
directly about a presumption against preemption. In ascertaining
congressional intent to impliedly preempt, the Garmon Court was
sensitive to the nature of the regulatory scheme in place-"new and
complicated" and "drawn with broad strokes"-that required the Court
to carry out Congress's purposes "by giving application to congressional
incompletion."35 The Court was concerned about the potential conflicts
that were posed by "inconsistent standards of substantive law and
differing remedial schemes."36 The Court expressed the opinion, often
repeated since, that state common law damages actions have a regulatory
effect, albeit indirect, making them a proper subject of preemption
29. 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959).
30. Id. at 237.
31. Id. at 237-38.
32. Id. at 240.
"By the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power
over industrial relations given by the Commerce Clause. Congress formulated a code
whereby it outlawed some aspects of labor activities and left others free for the operation of
economic forces. As to both categories, the areas that have been pre-empted by federal
authority and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by
fixed metes and bounds.... [The Act] leaves much to the states, though Congress has
refrained from telling us how much. This penumbral area can be rendered progressively
clear only by the course of litigation."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 48-8i(1955)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 237.
34. Id. at 241-43.
35. Id. at 24o.
36. Id. at 242.
May 2olo] 1225
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analysis: "Such regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award
of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to
pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy." The Court concluded that
state tort law damages were preempted because "to allow the States to
control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create
potential frustration of national purposes."3"
The Court did not discuss the presumption against preemption other
than to suggest that the "interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility" were overcome by a "compelling direction" by Congress
that entrusted national labor policy to the National Labor Relations
Board.39 A presumption against preemption would arguably have
produced a different result in a case like Garmon, in which traditional
state law had operated and would have gutted the "compelling direction"
by Congress to protect the very conduct the common law damages claims
would inhibit. One can imagine that the Court would have found any
presumption to be overcome as a result. Nevertheless, the Court did not
discuss the presumption and, instead, remarked that common law
damages actions have a regulatory effect, a statement that has influenced
every subsequent preemption claim involving common law damages
actions. The Court's discussion in Garmon has driven the analysis of the
preemption of common law damages actions.
After Garmon, the potential existed that the Court would broadly
apply implied obstacle preemption to common law damages actions. The
Court did not return to that subject until twenty-five years later in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.4 o Silkwood involved application of the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA)4' to a tort action for personal injuries and
property damage filed by the estate of Karen Silkwood, who had become
contaminated with plutonium while working at a nuclear power plant
operated by Kerr-McGee Corp.42 The estate's administrator alleged a
variety of irregularities in the operation of the facility that led to
Silkwood's contamination.43 He pled negligence and strict liability claims
and sought punitive damages."
The AEA was enacted in 1954 to free the nuclear energy industry
from total federal control and to provide for some private involvement in
the development of nuclear power.45 In an amendment to that Act,
37. Id. at 247.
38. Id. at 244.
39. Id
40. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 to 2297h-13 (2oo6).
42. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 241-43. She later died in an unrelated car accident. Id. at 242.
43. Id. at 243.
44. Id. at 241, 243, 245.
45. Ch. 724, 68 Stat. 919 (i954) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
1226 [Vol. 61:1217
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Congress sought to clarify the respective federal and state responsibilities
by giving the states limited regulatory authority, but precluded the states
from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear material. 6 Congress's
decision to prohibit the states from regulating safety was based on its
belief that the delegated federal agency, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, was more qualified to determine what type of safety
standards should be enacted in the area.47 The preemption provision of
the AEA thus defined a limited sphere of state authority carved out of
federal authority. Nonetheless, the Court concluded unanimously that
the AEA did not preempt Silkwood's compensatory damages action.48
The Justices agreed that such an award may have an "indirect"
regulatory impact on a nuclear facility, but Congress's silence on the
matter of preemption "takes on added significance in light of Congress'
failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured" by regulated
conduct.4 9 Consequently, neither implied field nor conflict preemption
was established.50
The presumption against preemption was not directly implicated
because the area being regulated, nuclear energy production and safety,
was federal and not one involving the "historic police powers"5' of the
states. Even in that context, however, the Court recognized that
Congress would not destroy traditional means of legal recourse without
at least acknowledging it openly." Furthermore, Congress's silence on
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(I), (c)(4); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) ("[U]ntil 1954 ... the use, control, and
ownership of nuclear technology remained a federal monopoly.").
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 206.
48. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251; id. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 279-80 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
49. Id. at 251 (majority opinion); see also id. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Because the
Federal Government does not regulate the compensation of victims, and because it is inconceivable
that Congress intended to leave victims with no remedy at all, the pre-emption analysis established by
Pacific Gas comfortably accommodates-indeed it compels-the conclusion that compensatory
damages are not preempted whereas punitive damages are." (footnote omitted)).
So. Id. at 256 (majority opinion).
51. The term "historic police powers" is not well defined though often used. It can be considered
for our purposes to mean general state power to protect the citizenry in its health and welfare. For a
discussion of the history of the term and its various meanings, see D. Benjamin Barros, The Police
Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 484 (2oo3).
Judges and legal scholars have made many attempts to define the police power or to
draw boundaries around its scope. Writers of early treatises tried to explain the police
power in terms of the common law theories reflected in cases that upheld police regulations.
Courts have often defined the police power by reference to the acknowledged legitimate
ends of the power, such as the promotion of the polity's health, safety, and morals, and
some commentators have attempted to limit the police power to the pursuit of these ends.
Many more commentators have attempted to define the police power by reference to
political theory.
Id.; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 2x8, 23o (1947).
52. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
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the topic suggested that traditional means of legal recourse indeed would
remain. 3 The Court rejected the notion that Congress would implicitly
permit the destruction of traditional state tort remedies simply by
regulating in a field, even one like nuclear power that requires
comprehensive safety standards.54
B. THE RISE OF EXPRESS PREEMPTION AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
Federal statutes have long been interpreted to determine
congressional intent to preempt, but those statutes often either do not
contain an express preemption provision or, if one exists, its scope is
unclear. Consequently, implied preemption doctrines have been more
frequently used to determine preemptive scope. When federal statutes
and their implementing regulations do contain preemption provisions,
courts, until the last twenty years, had regularly found such provisions to
be ambiguous regarding congressional intent to preempt but had applied
implied preemption principles anyway. Consequently, express
preemption analysis was rarely applied to preempt state common law
damages actions."
In the 1980s, however, more and more defendants in products
liability actions sought total protection from liability based on the
supremacy of federal regulation." Product manufacturers argued that
compliance with governmental safety regulations preempted the
operation of state tort laws that might find those regulations not to
establish due care." Compliance with governmental regulations has
always been relevant to the exercise of due care and proof of product
defect in tort actions, but it has never strictly been its measure.
Regulations that contain standards of conduct have historically been
considered to state minimum and not maximum standards. The general
consensus by the early 1990s was that "[t]he general approach to tort
claims against non-federal actors ... is to deny any preemptive or
53. Id.
54. Id. at 250-51. The primary area of contention in Silkwood was whether punitive damages
were preempted and, on this issue, the Court was divided. Three Justices-Blackmun, Marshall, and
Powell-dissented from the finding of no preemption of the punitive damages claim. See id. at 258
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 274 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55. OWEN, supra note 12, at 945-47; see also Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 3, at
983-97 (exploring the Court's struggle with implied and express preemption pre-1990).
56. OWEN, supra note 12, at 947.
57. Examples of this effort resulted in the prominent preemption cases that made their way to the
Supreme Court in the 1990s, such as Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), and
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
58. See generally Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2049 (2000).
59. OWEN, supra note 12, § 14.3, at 929; see also RESTAThMENT (THIRD) OF TOwRs: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §288C (1965).
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shielding effect unless there is some specific indication of a congressional
intent to preempt state tort law."6
Also during the mid-198os, the Supreme Court decided a number of
products liability matters, reflecting a general bias in favor of limited tort
liability.6' The Court's preemption doctrine and its restrictive approach to
products liability collided in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which
involved interpretation of the preemptive effect of the federal cigarette
labeling and advertising laws on cigarette products liability actions.
Cipollone was an action against three cigarette manufacturers on behalf
of Rose Cipollone, who died of lung cancer after smoking the
defendants' cigarettes for forty years.63 Her son pled a number of claims
centering on the manufacturers' failure to warn of the risks of smoking.64
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded that the express
preemption provisions in those statutes did not include common law tort
claims, but that the claims were impliedly preempted.'
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that when Congress had
expressed the preemptive scope of a statute, and that provision provided
a "reliable indicium of congressional intent," the express preemption
provision controlled.66 The Court recognized the presumption against
federal preemption of matters historically within the states' police
powers, and focused on discerning congressional intent. Perhaps
Cipollone's focus on the express preemption provisions was not
surprising in light of the turmoil in preemption analysis in the L98os over
the role of implied obstacle preemption. 8  Nevertheless, Cipollone
represented a dramatic shift in emphasis in preemption analysis from
implied conflict preemption to express preemption. It also represented a
remarkable extension of express preemption doctrine to include common
law damages actions.
6o. 2 AM. LAW INST. REPORTERS' STUY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSrBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY:
APPROACHES To LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 94 (1991)-
61. See generally Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 3I wAKE
FOREST L. REv. IO75 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court's products liability cases in the 198os,
particularly East River Steamship v. Delaval Corp., 476 U.S. 858 (1986), and Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), both of which limited the reach of tort liability in some
federal cases).
62. 505 U.S. at 508-09 (applying Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-92,79 Stat. 282; Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §H 1331-1341 (1988)).
63. Id. at 5o8.
64. Id. at 5o8-xo.
65. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986). State courts had found
otherwise. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1255 (N.J. 1990) (finding no
implied obstacle preemption by cigarette labeling laws).
66. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (quoting Malone v. white Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)).
67. Id. at 5I6.
68. See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 3, at 995-97-
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All the Justices in Cipollone agreed that the preemption analysis
should proceed by an interpretation of the scope of the express
preemption provisions of the statute.69 The federal cigarette labeling
laws, from 1965 and 1969, contained express preemption provisions. The
1965 Act stated: "No statement relating to smoking and health. . . shall
be required on any cigarette package."70 The 1969 Act amended the
preemption provision to state: "No requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."7' Noting that
congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" of preemption
analysis,72 the Court described its focus on the express preemption
provision:
Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a provision defining the
pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach
are not pre-empted.... Therefore, we need only identify the domain
expressly pre-empted by each of those sections.'
A majority of the Court found that the 1965 Act did not preempt
any state common law damages actions based on the precise words of the
provision and the presumption against preemption, which "reinforces the
appropriateness of a narrow reading" of the provision.74 The Justices
disagreed about the 1969 Act, however, which prohibited any
"requirement or prohibition . . . imposed under State law."' The
plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stevens (who has become a
prominent author of the Court's preemption opinions) used both the text
of the provisions and the legislative history to preempt some, but not all,
common law damages actions. 6 Justice Stevens read the language of the
preemption provision with particularity to conclude that the statute
"plainly reaches beyond such [positive] enactments,"' because, as stated
69. See 505 U.S. at 516-17; Tid. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 545-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 514 (majority opinion) (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5,79 Stat. 282).
71. Id. at 515 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 87 (1969)).
72. Id. at 516 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,505 (1978)).
73. Id. at 517.
74. Id. at 598. In addition, the Court found that the purposes and the regulatory context of the
Act also supported a narrow reading. See id. at 519.
75. Id. at 515 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b)).
76. Id. at 521-24 (plurality opinion) (discussing change in preemption provision from the 1965
Act to the 1969 Act).
77. Id. at 521 ("The phrase '[njo requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily
encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules." (alteration in original)).
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in Garmon,'7 common law damages actions can have a regulatory effect.
Justice Blackmun disagreed vehemently with the conclusion that
common law damages actions necessarily were precluded under the
statute because they constituted some general "requirement or
prohibition."" Cipollone marked an important shift away from the
protective treatment of common law damages actions evidenced by
Silkwood. The conclusion in Cipollone is also evidence that Garmon has
been extended well beyond its legitimate reach in implied preemption
analysis.
The ensuing seventeen years have been extraordinarily active ones
for the Court in defining express preemption analysis. The Court twice
analyzed the express preemption provision of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA), which provides that states may
not maintain "motor vehicle safety standards" that conflict with federal
performance standards on the same topic." In the first NTMVSA case,
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by
Justice Thomas, concluded that because there was no federal standard in
issue on the topic of anti-lock brakes for eighteen-wheel trucks, there
was neither express nor implied obstacle preemption of state design
defect claims based on the absence of such brakes.8 ' The Court raised a
question about the interaction between express and implied preemption
analysis,8' which it would resolve in the second NTMVSA case, Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., discussed shortly.
The Court's next preemption opinion, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr," also
focused on express preemption, this time under the Medical Device
Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.8" Plaintiff
alleged common law product defect claims arising out of his use of
defendant's pacemaker. The device had been approved under the FDA's
78. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing Garmon).
79. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) ("More important, the question whether common-law damages actions
exert a regulatory effect on manufacturers analogous to that of positive enactment ... is significantly
more complicated than the plurality's brief quotation from San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garnon would suggest. The effect of tort law on a manufacturer's behavior is necessarily indirect."
(citation omitted)). Justice Blackmun recognized that the Court's earlier cases assessing preemption of
common law damages actions had "declined on several recent occasions to find the regulatory effects
of state tort law direct or substantial enough to warrant preemption." Id. at 537 (referring to, among
others, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)).
8o. 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(I) (2oo6).
81. 514 U.S. 28o, 289 (1995).
82. Id. at 288-89 ("The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute
'implies'-i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other
matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-
emption. . . . At best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses
implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule.").
83. 5x8 U.S. 470 (1996).
84. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
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premarket notification approval regulations, a grandfathering method of
approval without the heightened rigor of the more elaborate premarket
approval process.8 The Court was divided on whether the MDA
preempted the plaintiff's claims, but all Justices again agreed that the
express preemption provision controlled the analysis.
The Justices hewed closely to the language of the express
preemption provision, which stated that states could not impose
"requirement[s] . . . different from, or in addition to" any federal
requirement related to safety or effectiveness of the device." The
premarket notification process did not require nor approve specific
design features." The majority opinion, again authored by Justice
Stevens, applied the presumption against preemption and, in doing so,
concluded that common law damages actions alleging design defects did
not impose "requirements" in this context. Four Justices concluded that
nothing in the legislation, its history, or its basic purpose suggested that
common law damages actions were intended to be requirements. A
majority of Justices agreed that common law obligations were not a
threat to the general federal requirements in Lohr." That majority also
agreed, however, that where the federal government had weighed the
competing interests relevant to device-specific requirements, reached an
unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations
should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases, and implemented
that conclusion via a specific mandate on manufacturers or products, a
case would exist for preemption under the statute and implementing
regulations. The specificity of the federal government's "weighing of
competing interests" would become a recurring theme.
The Court also addressed the FDA's position on preemption found
in a formally adopted regulation that implemented its statutory
preemption authority.93 Federal agency action regarding preemption is
85. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 476-80.
86. See id. at 484-85; id. at 503 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id
at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2oo6).
88. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 476-8o.
89. Id. at 493-94. He stated: "[W]e used a 'presumption against the pre-emption of state police
power regulations' to support a narrow interpretation of such an express command in Cipollone. That
approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of
matters of health and safety." Id. at 485 (citation omitted) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 518, 523 (1992)).
90. Id. at 487 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 501-02 (majority opinion).
92. Id. at 501. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion gave the Court its judgment in the case, and he
interpreted the word "requirement" to include common law damages actions in some circumstances.
but not in this case. Id. at So3-o4 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
93. 21I C.F.R. § 808.x(d)(2) (2oo8) (no preemption of state or local requirements that are "equal
to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the [MDA]"): id. § 8o8.r(d)(i) (no
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central to these cases because it may inform preemptive scope. All three
Lohr opinions explored the importance of the agency's position in
determining the scope of preemption.94 The Justices disagreed on the
extent to which they should rely on an agency's position on preemption,
though in earlier cases the Court had noted that agency regulations could
be informative on defining the scope of preemption where consistent
with statutory language." The FDA did not consider common law
damages actions to be preempted by its device approval regulations at
that time.96
These two disputed features in Lohr-the scope of express
preemption provisions (does "requirements" include common law
damages actions?), and the treatment of administrative agency opinion
on preemptive scope (to defer or not?) -are central to the modern
debate about preemption analysis. They also foreshadow the Court's
return to a focus on implied preemption doctrine in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co. one year later.
C. COORDINATING EXPRESS AND IMPLIED PREEMPTION AND THE IMPACT OF
SAVINGS CLAUSES
Only a few years after Lohr, the Court would muddy the
preemption waters again. In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,' the
Court was asked to analyze the effect of the express preemption
provision in the NTMVSA on a lawsuit alleging that a 1987 Honda was
defective in design because it did not have a driver's side air bag." The
NTMVSA contains a preemption provision that states that whenever a
federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) (defined elsewhere in
the statute as a minimum safety standard)99 is in effect, states may not
establish or continue any "standard applicable to the same aspect of
preemption of "State or local requirements of general applicability").
94. See 5j8 U.S. at 495-96 (agency regulations "substantially inform" interpretation of statute);
id. at 505-o6 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 511-12 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. See Norfolk & S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000) (discussing preemption under
Federal Railroad Safety Act, and debating relevance of agency position); see also CSX Transp. Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 67o (1993).
96. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 492-94. But see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1oo9 (2oo8).
Riegel is discussed infra regarding the FDA's change in position on this issue.
97. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). Geier is a five-to-four opinion; Justice Breyer wrote for the majority and
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Stevens,
the author of both the Cipollone and Lohr plurality and majority opinions, dissented in an opinion in
which Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsberg joined.
98. Id. at 865 (discussing the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 8o Stat. 718
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2006))).
99. 49 U.S.C. § 3o1o2(a)(9) ("'[M]otor vehicle safety standard' means a minimum standard for
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance.").
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performance" that is not identical to the federal standard." The statute
also contains a "savings clause," a provision in a federal statute that does
just that; it "saves," or preserves, some category of state law from being
overtaken by the federal statute. The NTMVSA savings clause states:
"Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued
under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law."'0' The clause appeared quite clearly to preserve the
operation of "liability under common law."
The Department of Transportation issued Standard 208 in 1984,"
after a lengthy administrative process, permitting automobile
manufacturers a choice of passive restraints, and culminating in the 1989
requirement that all cars have a driver's side air bag. Ms. Geier's 1987
Honda did not have a driver's side air bag." Justice Breyer wrote the
majority opinion and articulated a three-part preemption analysis when
faced with an express preemption provision: First, does the express
preemption provision preempt the lawsuit?'04 If not, then second, "do
ordinary pre-emption principles nonetheless apply?"05 If so, then third,
does the lawsuit "actually conflict" with the federal statute?'c
The express preemption provision analysis is quite different than
that in both Cipollone and Lohr, which involved close attention to
statutory text. The Court in Geier concluded that the express preemption
provision did not preempt plaintiff's action but did not discuss the terms
of the provision with the particularity it had previously." Nor did the
Court assess what the term "standard," as opposed to "requirement,"
might mean. Instead, the Court concluded, with little fanfare, that the
"savings clause" made that exercise unnecessary."" The Court said that
the savings clause assumed "that there are some significant number of
common-law liability cases to save."'0 9 The Court thus concluded that the
presence of the savings clause required a narrow reading of the express
preemption provision, excluding common law damages actions from its
operation, to give actual meaning to the savings clause."0
ioo. Id. § 30103(b)(I).
IlO. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988).
102. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984). For a discussion of the tortured administrative history, see Geier,
529 U.S. at 875-77; id. at 889-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting); and see also Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page,
Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415,443-
46 (1996).
103. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
104. Id. at 867.
1o5. Id.
i o6. Id.
107. See id. at 868.
xo8. Id. at 867-68.
10o9. Id. at 868.
rIlo. Id.
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The majority opinion never mentioned the presumption against
preemption. Indeed, the Court suggested that a broad reading of the
preemption provision might be appropriate in some circumstances, but
that "[w]e have found no convincing indication that Congress wanted to
preempt, not only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law
tort actions.".'" The Court used the existence of the savings clause to
defeat preemption but did not interpret the statute, evaluate its purposes,
or consider its legislative history. The Court certainly did not follow the
ordinary meaning of the savings clause-to preserve common law
liability principles.
After finding no express preemption, the Court concluded that the
express preemption provision, coupled with the savings clause, reflected
a neutral congressional policy toward the operation of implied
preemption doctrine when an actual conflict may exist. Thus, the Court
answered its second question in the affirmative-implied conflict
preemption principles continued to operate to the extent that they
prohibited actual conflict-reasoning that it would be impermissible to
"take from those who would enforce a federal law the very ability to
achieve the law's congressionally mandated objectives that the
Constitution, through the operation of ordinary preemption principles,
seeks to protect.""2 The Court was persuaded to apply implied conflict
preemption principles out of concern for the "careful regulatory scheme"
established by NTMVSA, despite the arguably plain meaning of the
savings clause."' The Court did not want to be confined to the traditional
categories of implied preemption-obstacle and impossibility-and
instead stated that it "assumed that Congress would not want either kind
of conflict.""4 Thus, the Court did not distinguish among types of federal-
state conflict. The Court had been badly splintered on how to interpret
express preemption provisions, so it is not entirely surprising that it
would revert to application of implied conflict preemption principles to
resolve ambiguity over congressional intent to preempt.
In answering the final question of whether an actual conflict existed,
the Court clearly perceived that common law tort actions might be
detrimental to thoughtfully established federal goals," 5 even in the face
of congressional intent to the contrary (i.e., the savings clause). In Geier,
the federal goals with which state law was found to conflict were located
not in the statute but in the air bag regulation, FMVSS 208.6 The Court
iii. Id.
112. Id. at 872.
113. See id. at 870.
114. Id. at 873-74-
115. Id. at 88r. A similar concern was raised in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 5i8 U.S. 4r8, 495-97
(2000).
ui6. See 529 U.S. at 88i.
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discussed at some length the federal objectives behind the regulation."
The Court relied extensively on the administrative history of the
regulation, as well as the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
contemporaneous comments about the purposes of the regulation."' The
Court was influenced by comments to the original standard and the
Secretary of Transportation's position, described in an amicus brief, that
the standard "embodies the Secretary's policy judgment that safety
would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection
systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car.,119
The Court noted the DOT's effort to balance a variety of concerns and,
therefore, concluded that the standard was neither a minimum nor a
maximum standard, but one representing a unique balance of
considerations. 120
The Court did not mention the presumption against preemption.12
The Court weighed the perceived federal regulatory objectives against
the states' general interest in promoting health and welfare, and in
compensating citizens for injuries caused by defective products.'22 It was
somewhat sympathetic to state concerns of compensating victims and
enhancing product safety, but concluded that jury-assessed standards
would lead to unpredictability and uncertainty in the standard of care.'23
The Court did not describe the burden necessary to establish implied
conflict preemption, but rejected any "special burden" on the proponent
of preemption. 4
Finally, the Court discussed the role of the federal agency's position
on the federal objectives behind the standard and its conclusion that tort
suits would stand as an obstacle to those objectives.' 25 The Court gave
"some weight" to the agency's interpretation because of the technical
nature of the subject matter, the complexity of the statutory scheme, and
the agency's expertise and "unique" qualification to comprehend the
likely impact of state requirements on that scheme[6 In addition, the
Court was influenced by the Secretary's consistent position on
117. Id. at 874-80.
i8. Id. at 875-77.
119. Id. at 881 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 25.
Geier, 529 U.S. 86i (No. 98-1811)).
I20. See id. at 877-81.
121. See id. at 906-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 881-82 (majority opinion).
123. See id.at 871-
124. See id at 874. The idea of a "special burden" stemmed from Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion, in which he criticized the Court's overly broad implied obstacle preemption analysis. See id. at
898-9 (Steven, J., dissenting).
I25. Id. at 88o-8 (majority opinion). Many scholars have discussed the importance of agency
position in preemption analysis. See generally, e.g , Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preernption, 102
MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004); Sharkey. supra note 22.
126. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
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preemption.127 The Court recognized that it should not readily find
conflict preemption in the absence of clear evidence of a conflict, but that
to require a formal agency statement on preemption was too
-128restrictive."
As mentioned earlier, federal agency position on preemption has
become increasingly important as a tool for litigants seeking to establish
intent to preempt. Lohr involved a specific agency rule promulgated to
define the scope of the MDA preemption provision prior to litigation,
and the Court was "substantially informed" by it.'29 The agency's position
in Geier was found in the history of the regulation and the Secretary of
Transportation's position in the litigation, which displayed some
consistency over time with predecessor opinions."' After Geier, federal
agency statements articulating federal objectives and assessing whether
those objectives might be thwarted by state law increased as federal
agencies sought greater and greater preemption of state law, particularly
common law tort claims.' 3 '
D. PosT-GEIER EXPRESS PREEMPTION ANALYSIS: AN EMERGING STASIS?
In the eight years between Cipollone and Geier, the Court
emphasized express preemption in a wholly new way, resisted discussing
the presumption against preemption, and struggled with how to balance
the historic role of state tort law with federal regulatory action. After
Geier, it was unclear what role express preemption analysis would
continue to play. Subsequent cases emphasized the search for
congressional intent but returned gradually to the presumption against
preemption.
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,'32 the Court followed Geier and
interpreted an express preemption provision with a savings clause not to
expressly preempt a product liability claim under the Federal Boat Safety
Act.'33 Sprietsma involved a Coast Guard assessment of the need for
propeller guards on recreational vessels that did not result in any
regulation.'34 The Court was faced with whether that failure to regulate
127. See id.
128. Id. at 884-85.
129. See 598 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996). Justice Breyer concurred, agreeing that "the relevant
administrative agency possesse[d] a degree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or other
administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect." Id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
130. See 529 U.S. at 883.
131. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353 (2oo6) (describing trend toward limiting operation of state tort law by federal agency
action); Sharkey, supra note 22.
132. 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002).
333. 46 U.S.C. §§ 43ol-4311 (2006).
'34. 537 U.S. at 6o-6r.
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preempted common law claims based on a failure to equip with propeller
guards, and found neither express nor implied conflict preemption.' The
Court was influenced by the Coast Guard regulations that preserved
state authority in the absence of federal action, and the fact that the
Coast Guard consistently concluded that its regulations did not have
preemptive effect, even though it had no formal rule on the subject."'
Sprietsma was a unanimous opinion."'
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,"8 the Court was presented with
another express preemption provision, this time from the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)."' The Court,
speaking through Justice Stevens, attended closely to the language of the
express preemption provision-as in both Cipollone and Geier-and was
also informed by the history of the legislation as well as the importance
of tort litigation as a complement to the regulatory scheme." The Court
did not describe the role of the presumption against preemption until it
had evaluated these three components of assessing Congress's intent.
Before concluding that analysis, and finding most claims not preempted
by the language of FIFRA,141 the Court noted that courts have "a duty to
accept the reading [of an express preemption provision] that disfavors
pre-emption."'42 The Court also noted that the "long history of tort
litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to
the basic presumption against pre-emption."' 43 It reiterated its adherence
to the presumption against preemption because tort litigation "provid[es]
an incentive to manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of
distributing inherently dangerous items."'"
The Court employed the narrow express preemption analysis
described in Cipollone, specifically rejecting the conclusion that common
law jury verdicts are the equivalent of "requirements" simply because
135. Id. at 64-66.
136. Id. at 65-66.
137. Id. at 53.
138. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
139. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2oo6).
140. Bates, 544 U.S. at 440-42 (noting the importance of the history of the legislation and the role
of tort litigation as a "common feature of the legal landscape").
141. Id. at 452.
142. Id. at 449.
143. Id. at 450. The Court continued: "If Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of a
long available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly." Id
(citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
144. Id.; see also id. at 459 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("Today's decision thus comports with this Court's increasing reluctance to expand federal statutes
beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption. This reluctance reflects that pre-
emption analysis is not '[a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with
federal objectives,' but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law
conflict." (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid wastes Mgmt., 505
U.S. 88, III (£992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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they may influence manufacturer decisionmaking.'45 The Court reasoned,
"A requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed," whereas "an
event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motives an optional decision is
not a requirement.",46 The Court concluded that the express preemption
provision preempted very few claims." The Court also expressed a sense
of frustration at the way the lower courts had broadly read the term
"requirements" after Cipollone, and chastised those courts for "too
quickly conclud[ing]" that tort claims were therefore also preempted
under FIFRA. 48 While the Court did not describe its express preemption
provision analysis as a narrow one, informed by the presumption against
preemption, such a conclusion can certainly be drawn from the analysis
in Bates.
Bates also addressed the importance of agency position on express
preemption. The regulating agency, the Environmental Protection
Agency, had shifted its position from being against preemption to being
in favor of it within the previous five years. 49 The Court was not
influenced by that shift in position, describing the result of the
Government's analysis as "particularly dubious given that just five years
ago the United States advocated the interpretation that we adopt
today."' 0 The Court endorsed the parallel operation of common law tort
claims, stating they "would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the
functioning of FIFRA[,] ... [which] contemplates that pesticide labels
will evolve over time, as manufacturers gain more information about
their products' performance in diverse settings.... [T]ort suits can serve
as a catalyst in this process."' 5' The concern expressed by the defendant
and the EPA that "tort suits led to a tcrazy-quilt' of FIFRA standards or
otherwise created any real hardship for manufacturers" fell on deaf ears,
as the Court observed that "for much of this period EPA appears to have
welcomed these tort suits."' 52 There was remarkable agreement in Bates;
Justice Breyer concurred and Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in
the judgment but dissented over the failure of the majority to focus on
the ordinary meaning of the preemption provision.15
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.'54 also represents remarkable agreement
among the Justices, but in contrary ways to the agreement in Bates. The
145. Id. at 445 (majority opinion).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 452.
148. Id. at 446.
149. See id. at 436-37 & n.7, 449.
150. Id. at 449.
ii. Id. at 451.
152. Id. at 451-52.
'53. Id. at 454 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 455, 457 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
154. 552 U.s. 312 (2oo8).
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Court in Riegel was asked to address for a third time express preemption
under the Medical Device Amendments, this time regarding claims
involving devices approved under the premarket approval process."' The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the MDA expressly
preempts such claims." 6 The Court was critical of the role of common law
tort claims and expansive in its description of the scope of express
preemption,'57 unlike in Bates. The Court's express preemption analysis
did not emphasize congressional intent to preempt; instead, it reaffirmed
its own understanding of the term "requirements." 8 The Court declared
that "requirements" includes common law tort claims, stating: "Congress
is entitled to know what meaning this Court will assign to terms regularly
used in its enactments. Absent other indication, reference to a State's
'requirements' includes its common-law duties."' 59 This contrary
conclusion to both the sentiment and discussion in Bates about
"requirements" is, at the least, an unusual turnabout in so short a time.
While thus defining the term "requirement" for future Congresses,
the Court displayed its distrust of the operation of common law tort
actions. According to the Riegel Court, tort law as applied by juries is
"less deserving of preservation" than other state regulations because
juries are incapable of balancing costs and benefits adequately as they
"see[] only the cost[s] of a more dangerous design, and [are] not
concerned with [the] benefits" consumers reap by the manufacturer's
design choices.'60 It is "implausible," according to the Court, that
Congress would create the "perverse distinction" that grants greater
power to a single state jury than to state officials. 6' These remarks leave
little, if anything, left of the historic place that state tort law held in
regulating public safety, and certainly have little in common with Justice
Stevens's remarks on that score in Bates. There was no mention of the
''presumption against preemption."
The Riegel Court also discussed, at some length, the effect of the
FDA's changing position on preemption, even though it acknowledged
that the position was not relevant to the case because the statutory
155. Id. The second time was in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 352
(2oo), involving a so-called fraud-on-the-agency theory that the Court found was not expressly
preempted by the MDA's express preemption provision but was impliedly preempted because policing
fraud on an agency is a uniquely federal matter.
156. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322-26.
157. See id at 324-25.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 325. For a more thorough discussion regarding Congress's intent, see id. at 333
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, the author of Cipollone, Lohr, Sprietsma, and Bates,
concurred on the scope of "requirements" because he considered it consistent with the result in Lohr.
See id. at 330-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
16o. Id. at 325 (majority opinion).
x6rI. Id.
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language was clear. 12 The FDA had recently changed its position on the
scope of the MDA preemption provision as it applied to the premarket
approval process.' While largely dicta, the Court's statements displayed
some sympathy for the proposition that recent agency position might be
relevant to an assessment of preemptive scope, despite longstanding
agency position to the contrary. ' These statements are quite different
than those by the Court on this issue in Geier and Bates.
Some observers have described Riegel as a fairly narrow application
of the MDA express preemption provision and a logical extension of
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.6' The lack of respect for the traditional
longstanding role of state tort law and the failure to mention the
presumption against preemption is inconsistent with recent cases and,
therefore, unsettling.' The discussion of agency position on preemption
is also inconsistent with prior cases. 6 ,
The final express preemption case meriting discussion is Altria
Group, Inc. v. Good. Decided after Riegel, Altria Group involved the
continuing validity of Cipollone in defining the claims that survived
express preemption under the cigarette labeling laws after the ensuing
sixteen years of preemption doctrine.I68 After Riegel and its eight-to-one
opinion in favor (in dicta, at least) of a more expansive reading of
express preemption provisions and of the meaning of "requirement," one
might have expected that Justice Stevens's plurality opinion in Cipollone
had been outgrown. In a stunning turn of events, however, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter, held
that the more moderate approach of the plurality opinion of Cipollone
does indeed control the express preemption analysis of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.' The majority rejected the
broader scope of preemption analysis proposed by Justice Scalia in
162. See id. at 326.
163. Id. at326-27.
164. Id. at 327 ("But of course the agency's earlier position.. . is even more compromised, indeed
deprived of all claim to deference, by the fact that it is no longer the agency's position.").
165. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law
Products Liability Claims, lo2 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 415, 415 nn.3-4 (2oo8), http:I/
colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2oo8/o7/what-riegel-por.html.
166. See Davis, supra note 6, at 771-73 (2009) (discussing importance of the debate in Riegel to the
larger discussion of the importance of tort law).
167. The discussion in Riegel may now also be moot because of an effort in Congress to undo the
result. See Legislation: Supporters, Opponents Debate Measure To Overturn High Court's Preemption
Ruling, 37 Prod. Saf. & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) 866 (Aug. so, 2009).
168. 129 S. Ct. 538, 542 (2o8).
169. Id. at 549 ("In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that 'the phrase "based
on smoking and health" fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty not




Cipollone,7o and advocated by Justice Thomas in dissent in Altria,'7 1
stating: "Justice Scalia's approach was rejected by seven Members of the
Court, and in the almost 17 years since Cipollone was decided Congress
has done nothing to indicate its approval of that approach." 7 2 Justice
Stevens's opinion in Altria Group confirmed the presumption against
preemption and a fair but narrow reading of the scope of express
preemption provisions."
Bates, Riegel, and Altria Group, as the most recent express
preemption opinions, give contrary signals about the role of the
presumption against preemption and determining express congressional
intent to preempt. It appears that, for the time being, Justice Stevens's
approach to express preemption fashioned in Cipollone, Bates, and Altria
Group carries the day.
III. IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION POST-GEIER: WYETH V. LEVINE
In March 2009, the Court decided Wyeth v. Levine,"' the much-
anticipated implied preemption case involving whether common law tort
claims challenging the adequacy of federally approved pharmaceutical
labeling are preempted under the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).'7 ' The FDCA does not have an express preemption provision
relating to pharmaceutical approvals, so the case required an application
of implied preemption.', 6 The Court had not decided a pure implied
preemption case (one not involving any express preemption provision) in
recent history. In addition, the FDA, which had for years been in favor of
the concurrent operation of state common law damages actions, had
changed its position on preemption: first, in a series of amicus briefs in
cases beginning in 2004, and then in a 2006 preamble to new
pharmaceutical labeling regulations.7' The lower courts had struggled
with implied preemption doctrine in these cases and whether to consider
the FDA's changed position in the analysis."'
170. 505 U.S. at 552-54 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
171. 129 S. Ct. at 552-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 545 n.7 (majority opinion).
172. Id. at 545 n.7.
173. See id. at 543.
174. 129S. Ct. 1187,1191(2009).
175. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
176. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195-96.
177. See 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2oo6); Davis, Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1090
(chronicling the history of the change in FDA preemption policy); see also Sharkey, supra note 22, at
238-42.
178. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 5. Ct. 1578 (2009)
(vacating in light of Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187); Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham, 583 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D.
Pa. 2008); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind. 2oo8).
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Levine involved the anti-nausea drug Phenergan, which had been
approved in 1955. 79 Ms. Levine had been injected with the drug to
alleviate symptoms from a migraine headache." Through inadvertent
injection into an artery, gangrene, a known side effect, resulted and her
arm eventually had to be amputated.'8 , Wyeth, Phenergan's
manufacturer, knew about the risk of intra-arterial injection, and had
warned about it in a section of the labeling; that labeling had been
approved over the years by the FDA.' Ms. Levine claimed that the
labeling inadequately warned of the risk of gangrene, and the jury
agreed.'"' The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling
that Ms. Levine's claims were not impliedly preempted by the FDA's
labeling approvals."'
Wyeth made two separate implied conflict preemption arguments:
first, that it would have been impossible for it to comply with the state
law duty to warn without violating federal law; and second, that
recognition of the plaintiff's claims would act as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of federal objectives because it would substitute a lay
jury's decision for the expert judgment of the FDA."' The Court,
speaking through Justice Stevens in a six-to-three majority opinion,
found that the FDA's product labeling approvals did not impliedly
preempt Levine's tort claims under either argument.'
A. REAFFIRMING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
The Court began by reaffirming the "two cornerstones of [its] pre-
emption jurisprudence": first, that "the purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case"; and second, in "all pre-
emption cases," and particularly those involving fields traditionally
occupied by states, the analysis begins with the presumption against
preemption.' The Court rejected Wyeth's argument that the
presumption should not apply in implied preemption cases, stating: "This
Court has long held to the contrary."'88
The Court also responded to Wyeth's argument that, because the
federal government had long regulated drugs, the presumption should
not operate.'89 The Court rejected this argument, stating that it
179. See 129S. Ct. at 1u91.
ISo. Id.
I8I. Id.
182. Id. at 1192.
183. Id. at 1193.
184. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 194 (Vt. 2007).
185. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1193-94.
186. ld. at 1191.
187. Id. at I194-95 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 5I8 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).




"misunderstands" the presumption which "accounts for the historic
presence of state law but does not rely on the absence of federal
regulation."' 90
B. IMPOSSIBILITY CONFLICT PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The Court's discussion of impossibility conflict preemption is one of
the most thorough it has ever written. Wyeth argued that it would be
subject to misbranding liability under FDA regulations if it altered its
label, as plaintiff claimed it should have, because the FDA must approve
all labeling.' The Court disagreed after a thorough exploration of the
labeling approval regulations that permit pharmaceutical manufacturers
to alter their warning labels, after initial product approval, to add or
strengthen a warning.' 92 The Court emphasized that "through many
amendments to the FDCA and to FDA regulations, it has remained a
central premise of federal drug regulation that the manufacturer bears
responsibility for the content of its label at all times."'9
Implied conflict preemption based on the impossibility of complying
with both federal and state law has only rarely been applied, and the
Court rejected it in this instance, too.'94 The Court noted that
impossibility preemption is "a demanding defense"'95 and that it would
require "clear evidence" of impossibility to succeed."'
The Court found no "clear evidence" after an intense assessment of
the federal regulatory scheme and a searching review of the record."
The Court described the type of evidence that might suffice: "[Wyeth]
does not argue that it attempted to give the kind of warning required by
the Vermont jury but was prohibited from doing so by the FDA."'
There was no evidence that the FDA gave more than "passing attention"
to the issue and certainly no affirmative decision to prohibit Wyeth from
strengthening its warning.'99 The Court focused on the "central premise
of federal drug regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for
the content of its label at all times."" Only proof of a direct federal
prohibition of conduct that state law requires would seem to establish an
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1197.
192. Id.
193. Id. at I197-98.
194. Id. at 1198-99.
195. Id. at 1199.
196. Id. at 1198 ("But absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to




'99. Id. at I1198-99.
200. Id. at I1I97-98.
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impossible conflict justifying preemption and, perhaps, overcome the& 20presumption against preemption. 0
C. IMPLIED OBSTACLE PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The Levine Court's discussion of implied obstacle preemption is
important because of its contrast with Geier. It will be helpful to break
down the Court's response to Wyeth's arguments of obstacle conflict
preemption. Implied obstacle preemption, according to the Court,
requires two things: (i) an identification of the congressional purposes or
objectives which support the federal law;" and (2) a rigorous assessment
of whether Congress, not just the agency charged with effectuating
Congress's intent, considered state law claims to pose an obstacle to the
accomplishment of those objectives.0
Borrowing from the successful obstacle conflict preemption analysis
in Geier, Wyeth argued that Levine's tort claims were preempted
because "they interfere with 'Congress's purpose to entrust an expert
agency to make drug labeling decisions that strike a balance between
competing objectives.""'2 4 The Court rejected these arguments because
they relied on an "untenable interpretation" of congressional intent and
"an overbroad view" of an agency's power to preempt state law.05
Wyeth contended that once the FDA approves a drug's label, that
decision reflects both a floor and a ceiling for regulation, and state law
may not hold that decision inadequate.2o6 The Court summarily rejected
this assessment of federal objectives because it was contrary to all
evidence of Congress's purposes.207 The Court explored the history of
federal regulation of pharmaceutical approvals and was influenced by
Congress's failure to expressly preempt, stating: "If Congress thought
state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have
enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the
FDCA's 70-year history. "2os The Court found congressional silence, in
the face of "awareness" of concurrent state tort litigation, to be
"powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be
the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness."20
201. Id. at 199.
202. Id. at i199; see also Davis, Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at i132-34 (synthesizing implied
conflict preemption principles).
203. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.




208. Id. at 1200. Congress had not expressly preempted state tort law claims as it had in other
contexts, such as in the Medical Device Amendments. See id.
209. Id. Further, "[Congress] may also have recognized that state-law remedies further consumer
protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate
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Wyeth argued that the FDA's position in favor of preemption by its
labeling decisions, as set forth in the preamble to its 2oo6 labeling
regulation, was powerful evidence that the agency had precisely balanced
the risks and benefits of the labeling and, thus, state tort jury verdicts
should not interfere with that balance.2 0 The Court acknowledged that
an agency regulation "with the force of law" can preempt conflicting
state requirements, but it held that the Court performs its own conflict
determination when deciding such cases, as it had in Geier."'
The Court rejected reliance on the FDA's "mere assertion" that
state law posed an obstacle.2 2 Instead, it confirmed that "[t]he weight we
accord the agency's explanation of state law's impact on the federal
scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness."" 3
The FDA's position did not deserve deference in this instance because
(i) the FDA stated its position on preemption after having earlier stated
that the rule would not "have federalism implications," (2) the agency
finalized the rule without giving states an opportunity to comment, and
(3) the position was at odds with the available evidence of Congress's
purposes and the agency's own longstanding position in favor of the
operation of state tort law.214 The Court explored the many ways that tort
law acts as a complement to federal drug regulation.215
The Court distinguished Geier, upon which Wyeth had relied. First,
Geier involved formal agency rulemaking that embodied the
government's policies, not an individualized product approval as in
Levine.216 Second, in Geier, the Court assessed the preemptive effect of
the rule independently, informed by the agency's explanation, not driven
by it."' The Court in Levine found the FDA's "newfound opinion" to be
inconsistent with the "longstanding coexistence of state and federal law
and the FDA's traditional recognition of state-law remedies" and thus
unpersuasive on assessing a current conflict with federal objectives.28
The Court recognized that the FDA's drug regulations could
potentially impliedly preempt state tort law claims, but that this was not
warnings." Id. at I199-l200.
210. Id. at 1200.
211. Id. at 1200-01.
212. Id. at 1201.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1201-02.
215. Id. at 1202 ("State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug
manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory function that
may motivate injured persons to come forward with information. Failure-to-warn actions, in
particular, lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary
responsibility for their drug labeling at all times.").
216. Id. at 1203.
217. Id
218. Id. at 1203-o4.
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such a case.219 Justice Breyer, in concurrence, reminded readers that
"lawful specific regulations" that establish a ceiling and a floor might
have preemptive effect. 20 Justice Thomas strongly criticized obstacle
conflict preemption, calling for its abandonment as inconsistent with
constitutional federalism principles and likely to result in overreaching.2'
Levine represents a narrower implied obstacle conflict preemption
analysis after Geier. The Court seems to have settled into a more
balanced approach to the value of state common law tort actions within
its implied conflict preemption analysis. The "new" presumption against
preemption has its greatest impact in this analysis.
IV. A SYNTHESIS OF PREEMPTION ANALYSIS: REVEALING THE "NEW"
PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
The Court has made it clear that the presumption against
preemption of historic state police powers continues to operate in cases
of both express and implied preemption. Only clear and manifest intent
of Congress to the contrary will defeat the presumption. The question
remaining is what type of evidence will support that conclusion. That is
where the "new" presumption against preemption plays its role.
A. THE NEW PRESUMPTION As DEFAULT IN EXPRESS PREEMPTION
ANALYSIS
When an express preemption provision provides "clear and
manifest" evidence of Congress's intent, it will control. Justice Stevens, in
Cipollone, Lohr, Bates, Altria Group, and, to a lesser extent, in his
concurrence in Riegel, provides the best statement of the current manner
of interpreting express preemption provisions to discern congressional
intent: narrowly based on the ordinary meaning of the statute's terms, its
structure, purposes, and history, with an understanding that Congress
would not defeat the operation of traditional, historic police powers of
the states without quite explicitly saying so. All of this seems to suggest
that a "new"l presumption against preemption operates as a meaningful
default rule when interpreting congressional intent to preempt. For the
Court to state, as it did in Bates,22 that courts should accept a reading of
an express preemption provision that disfavors preemption strongly
suggests a presumption with teeth. The Riegel Court did not mention the
presumption, however. I offer two reasons for that omission: (i) the
Court had analyzed preemption under the Medical Device Amendments
219. Id.
220. Id. at I204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito dissented in an opinion in
which the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia joined. See id. at 1217-31 (Alito, J., dissenting).
222. See 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
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twice before, in Lohr and Buckman, and had found the express
preemption language at issue to clearly indicate Congress's intent; and
(2) the regulatory scheme in Riegel was more rigorous and device-
specific than that in Lohr and, therefore, arguably consistent with
congressional intent to preempt under the statute. While I would take
issue with that assessment, and would agree with Justice Ginsburg's
evaluation of that intent,2 the Court in Riegel seemed anxious to close
the door on preemption under the Medical Device Amendments. Justice
Stevens's majority opinion in Altria Group, on the heels of Riegel, may
be the most useful explanation of how to treat Riegel; the Altria Group
majority clearly endorsed a strong role for the presumption in express
preemption cases.
The Court seems intent on assessing statutory language with
particularity, to discern whether the terms used, such as "requirements,"
"statements," or "standards," fairly include state common law claims
under the relevant statute's history alone, and not with reference to use
of the terms in other statutory schemes. This statute-centered focus
comes after years of proponents of preemption trying to stretch the
meaning of "requirements." The Riegel Court tried to define that term
for future Congresses, though Congress could still undo the Court's
definition. The "new" presumption against preemption puts
overreaching of statutory definitions in its place by requiring a tighter fit
between statutory context and language.
If the Court's analysis of express preemption provisions teaches
anything, it is that statutes are unique and so is the search for
congressional intent. Relying on the interpretation of language from one
statute runs the risk of proving too much in the interpretation of similar
language in another statute. I hesitate to single out any one statute as an
example of express preemption analysis, but cases involving the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act224 may serve as good examples.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act established a Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program (the "Program") that provides a no-fault
223. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1014-19 (2oo8) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3ooaa-i to -34 (2oo6). For additional history on the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act, see Lainie Rutkow et al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health: The
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and Its Influence During the Last Tvo Decades, II
PENN ST. L. REv. 681, 683-84 (2007).
With the swine flu episode a not-so-distant memory, Congress fashioned a no-fault, ideally
non-adversarial system to compensate the families of children who were injured after
receiving a vaccination. It took Congress over three years to pass the final legislation that
created the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP); the program has
remained in effect for nearly twenty years. During the last few years, when the government
has considered massive vaccine campaigns for seasonal influenza and smallpox, the VICP
has served as a model program for congressional members.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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compensation system as an alternative to tort litigation against vaccine
manufacturers for personal injuries that result from vaccines. 25 The
Program defines the vaccines covered and the injuries compensated; "if
certain predetermined conditions are met, a person will automatically
receive an award from the [Program].""' Fault by the vaccine
manufacturer need not be demonstrated.227 A victim can directly sue a
vaccine manufacturer if the petition for compensation is denied, the
person rejects the compensation granted, or the vaccine is not covered by
the Program.228
In two recent cases, courts have disagreed about how to interpret
the following provision in the Act that addresses the preemption of
certain state common law tort claims: "Except as provided in subsections
(b), (c), and (e) . .-. State law shall apply to a civil action brought for
damages for a vaccine-related injury or death."229 Subsection (b) states:
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages
arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the
administration of a vaccine after October i, 1988, if the injury or death
resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the
vaccine was properly Krepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings.
The question, of course, is how much state law did Congress intend
to displace by this language? Congress established a compensation
scheme that expressly displaces some state law while also defining the
types of state law claims that survive. There would be no need to say that
"state law shall apply" if no state law claims survive. The question then
remains, how much, and what, state law survives?
Plaintiffs in American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari argued that
their son suffered neurological damages caused by vaccines made with a
mercury-laden preservative for which a substitute was then available and,
therefore, that the child's injury was avoidable.' The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed a finding of no express preemption of the design defect
claim, concluding that a case-by-case basis of determining whether a side
effect was unavoidable was required.232 The Ferrari court based its
225. 42 U.S.C. § 3ooaa-I x(a)(2)(A); see also Rutkow et al., supra note 224, at 684-87 (describing
the Program); Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A
Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 156-58 (1988) (explaining the
compensation mechanism). For the history and structure of the Act, see Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561
F.3d 233, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2009), cert granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. Mar. 8,2010) (No. 09-152).
226. Rutkow et al., supra note 224, at 684-86 (describing the Program in detail).
227. 42 U.S.C. §3ooaa-Ii(c); see also Rutkow et al., supra note 224, at 684.
228. Rutkow et al., supra note 224, at 688.
229. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-22(a).
230. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(I).
231. 668 S.E.2d 236, 237-38 (Ga. 2008).
232. Id. at 240.
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decision on a review of the statute's text, its legislative history, and the
presumption against preemption.3
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc. ,2
disagreed. The Third Circuit found that the statute preempted all design
defect claims, and that a case-by-case analysis of such claims would
defeat Congress's intent in establishing the compensation scheme, part of
which was to promote the availability of vaccines." The vaccine
manufacturers in Ferrari petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
but the Ferraris dismissed their claims in state court without prejudice."'
The Bruesewitzes' petition for certiorari was granted.3
The statute's terms appear on their face to carve out some design
defect claims that are not preempted.3 The statute is complex and its
structure and history seem to admit different conclusions regarding the
scope of the preemption provision. The case presents a unique federal
compensation scheme, which clearly displaces the operation of a
substantial amount of state common law by its very terms. At the same
time, Congress endorsed the parallel operation of some state law by
borrowing language from comment k to section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which recognizes that unavoidably unsafe products
should not be subject to strict liability.239 The Supreme Court asked for
an opinion from the Solicitor General on the Government's position on
preemption in Ferrari.24 o Governing agencies may assist in assessing
233. See id. at 238-39.
234. 561 F.3d 233, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2oo9), cert granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No.
09-152).
235. Id. at 246-47.
236. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21, Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari,
No. o8-iI20 (Jan. 29, 2olo).
237. 78 U.S.L.W. 3521.
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 3ooaa-22(b)(I) (2oo6).
239. The Restatement of Torts states, "There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use," one of
which is a vaccine, for which sellers cannot be held liable if they are "properly prepared and
marketed" and accompanied by a "proper warning." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k
(1965); cf Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. RE. 839,
842-43 (2009) (describing case law under comment k as "unintelligible" and having produced
confusion among courts and commentators).
240. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 236, at i. The White House's
recently announced position restricting executive agencies to preemption positions "with full
consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis,"
Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
24,693 (May 20, 2009) (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 2o6 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601)), is relevant but does not take a very strident position either for or against preemptiun
generally. The United States's brief in Ferrari. filed January 29, 2010, takes the position that Congress
did intend to preempt design defect claims in the vaccine cases and has asked the Court to accept
certiorari in Bruesewitz. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 236, at 7.
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congressional intent but the Court has made quite clear that it is
Congress's intent that controls.24'
Ferrari may have the better analysis because it recognizes that the
compensation scheme Congress created did not specifically articulate
those claims that may be deemed unavoidable. Because the allegation in
Ferrari was that an alternative formulation was available, rendering the
defect avoidable, the preemption provision arguably does not control.
The presumption against preemption, requiring a narrow reading of the
terms of a statute with a view to maintain state law absent clear evidence
to the contrary, supports, in principle, the result in Ferrari-not all design
defects in vaccines are the result of unavoidable conditions. Proof of
Congress's intent will also, of course, be assessed by reference to the
legislative history and the purposes behind the compensation scheme. If
clear preemptive intent can be derived, it will control. The "new"
presumption against preemption, which acts as a default in express
preemption cases in which Congress's clear intent to preempt has not
been established, supports the conclusion that some set of design defect
claims survived preemption by the Vaccine Injury Act.
Finally, the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), mentioned in
the introduction to this Article, has an express preemption provision with
a savings clause.242 Cases interpreting the CPSA found no express
preemptive intent, because of the savings clause, and also held that
implied preemption defeated some claims.243 The operation of savings
clauses should be reexamined in light of a refocus on clear congressional
intent grounded in the presumption against preemption. The analysis in
Geier, which did not consider the presumption against preemption, is
inconsistent with the "new" presumption against preemption which
requires a narrow view of Congress's express preemptive language and a
default to state law absent clear intent to preempt.
B. THE NEW PRESUMPTION AS RESTRICTING THE DEFINITION OF CONFLICT
PREEMPTION
Implied conflict preemption similarly incorporates the presumption
against preemption, though how the presumption operates in such cases
is more uncertain than within express preemption analysis. Conflict
preemption requires that the proponent establish an actual conflict
between federal and state law, either because of impossibility of
compliance with both, or because state law frustrates federal objectives.
When the Court applies either kind of implied conflict preemption, it
241. See supra notes 172-86 and accompanying text.
242. 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
243. See, e.g., Moe v. MTD Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d '79 (8th Cir. '995) (applying i5 U.S.C. § 2075);
BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 251 S.W-3d 500 (Tex. 2oo8) (same).
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rarely discusses how the presumption operates in the establishment of
actual conflict. The Court tends to be very situation-specific and fact-
driven in determining what constitutes an actual conflict. Geier is a
classic example of that. The Court discusses the value of the relevant
state law in its determination of actual conflict but it does not otherwise
describe how the presumption against preemption operates in these
cases.
The "new" presumption against preemption in implied conflict
preemption restricts the definition of actual conflict. For example, when
assessing implied impossibility conflict, the Court acknowledged in
Levine that it is a "demanding" defense, and thus unlikely to be
established without substantial evidence of actual impossibility.?
Because the Court has so rarely seen a case of impossibility, only a
circumstance where federal law affirmatively prohibits what state law
affirmatively requires should suffice. A common law tort judgment
requiring a defendant to pay damages would, therefore, typically not
constitute an affirmative state law obligation that would make it
impossible to comply with a contrary federal obligation. Levine teaches
that an agency position on impossibility will not suffice to create an
impossible conflict.245
Another pharmaceutical labeling case may be a test for impossibility
conflict preemption. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc."6 involved failure-to-warn
claims based on the increased risk of suicidality from taking the anti-
depressant drug Paxil." Mrs. Colacicco had taken Paxil and committed
suicide, allegedly as a result.24' Her estate sued both the manufacturer of
the generic drug she had taken and the manufacturer of the brand name
drug, Glaxo SmithKline.2" The FDA, according to the Court of Appeals,
had
repeatedly rejected the scientific basis for the warnings that Colacicco
and [a companion plaintiff] argue should have been included in the
244. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
246. 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2oo8), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (vacating in light of Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)).
247. Id. at 256; see also Davis, Implied Preemption, supra note 3. at 1095-98 (exploring history of
warnings on selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, or SSRIs, like Paxil).
248. Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 256.
249. Id. Cases against generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are pending nationwide and involve
claims of implied conflict preemption similar to those involving the brand name manufacturers. See,
e.g., Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (D. Vt. 2009) ("Thus, although the Levine decision did
not definitively dispose of the issues in this case, its statement that '[f]ailure-to-warn actions, in
particular, lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary
responsibility for their drug labeling at all times,' Levine does nut appcar to permit the caveat, 'except
for generic drug manufacturers." (citation omitted) (quoting Levine, 129 8. Ct. at 1202) (citing Stacel
v. Teva Pharms., 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 90607 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 60o F. Supp. 2d
1262, 1265-66 (W.D. Okla. 2009))).
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labeling. The FDA has actively monitored the possible association
between SSRIs and suicide for nearly twenty years, and has concluded
that the suicide warnings desired by plaintiffs are without scientific
basis and would therefore be false and misleading.2 0
The Court of Appeals thus sustained a finding of implied conflict
preemption on the narrow ground that the FDA had "clearly and
publicly stated its position prior to the prescriptions and deaths at
issue."25t Consequently, a state law duty to warn of such an association
would render the label misbranded under federal law based on the
"FDA's oft-repeated conclusion that the evidence did not support such
an association" requiring a warning.
The plaintiffs argued that "nothing less than the FDA's explicit
rejection of a drug manufacturer's request to add a contested warning to
its drug labeling should suffice to establish conflict preemption."' 53 The
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the manufacturer is responsible for
its labeling under the FDCA.254 One could make the argument, after
Levine, that only an affirmative decision by the FDA to prohibit a
manufacturer's proposed labeling change will support impossibility
conflict preemption of a state common law duty. I am not aware of a
circumstance where a pharmaceutical manufacturer has asked to
enhance a warning and been affirmatively rebuffed by the FDA after full
assessment of the data. Colacicco does not present that situation, though
it is a stronger case than Levine because of the history of the FDA's
involvement with SSRI labeling.' Nevertheless, the "new" presumption
against preemption would focus on the manufacturer's control of the
evidence of post-approval risks and the absence of an affirmative FDA
prohibition against altering the labeling. Prior FDA determinations of
labeling adequacy may not create an impossible conflict with a state law
warning obligation under the "new" presumption against preemption.256
Implied obstacle conflict preemption requires an assessment of
congressional objectives with which state common law may conflict, and
an evaluation of whether the state common law indeed frustrates those
objectives. The "new" presumption against preemption has its greatest
importance, in my estimation, in obstacle conflict preemption. The
250. Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 269.
251. Id. at 271.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 272.
254. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. I187, 1197-98 (2009).
255. See Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 268, 268-71 ("The FDA has actively monitored the possible
association between SSRIs and suicide for nearly twenty years.").
256. See Davis, Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at I148-SI. For a case involving SSRIs finding
no implied conffict preemption post-Levine, consistent with application of the presumption against




"new"5 presumption is represented by the Court's emphasis, in Levine, on
congressional, not agency, intent when assessing federal objectives and
its implicit rejection of a broader assessment of those objectives in Geier.
As in Garmon and Silkwood, Levine reaffirmed that congressional
silence on preemption in the face of awareness of the longstanding
operation of tort laws is persuasive evidence against a finding that state
common law poses an obstacle to accomplishing federal objectives.5
Reasoned agency explanations on preemption, as opposed to political or
policy shifts in position or generalized statements of federal objectives,
may be useful in assessing federal objectives, but the courts must make
an independent assessment. Shifts in agency position on preemption are
inherently suspect and should be met with skepticism. Consequently,
deference to agency pronouncements on preemption is unwarranted,
absent formal rulemaking on the subject. These features of the "new"
presumption, primarily from Levine but born of the Court's struggle with
implied obstacle preemption generally, give it significant teeth.
Recent cases involving FDA rules regarding food safety are good
examples of the "new" presumption against preemption in implied
obstacle conflict preemption. In Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C.,
plaintiff argued that defendant should have warned of the risk of
mercury poisoning from eating its canned tuna. 8 Defendant sought
preemption based on various FDA actions amounting to a decision not
to regulate and an FDA letter opining about the preemptive effect of its
prior actions.259 The Court of Appeals reminded us that it is federal law
that preempts, not any federal action.' While formal rulemaking is not
required, the informal agency positions taken regarding mercury in tuna
did not suffice.26 Fellner is an excellent example of a court aggressively
challenging whether the proposed federal objectives that supposedly
preempt state law reflect congressional intent.262
CONCLUSION
The presumption against preemption is part of the landscape of
preemption jurisprudence, perhaps now more than at any time in recent
memory. The Court has reaffirmed the presumption in several recent
cases. While uncertainty remains about how it operates, this Article has
identified a "new" presumption against preemption. A court must always
be mindful of the "touchstone" of preemption: congressional intent. If a
proponent of preemption has not established the "clear and manifest"
257. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
258. 539 F-3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2008).
259. Id. at 24 1-42.
260. Id. at 250.
261. Id. at 251-55.
262. Id. at 245.
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intent to preempt in areas involving the historic police powers of the
states, a case for preemption has not been made.
That intent can be established, first, through an express preemption
provision. Such a provision should be narrowly interpreted in light of the
presumption against preemption, which operates as a meaningful default
rule in the absence of that clear and manifest intent. A court should be
attentive to the legislative scheme, its structure, and purpose, all the
while focusing on congressional intent, not the intent of those federal
actors and others who profess a substitute for it.
Implied conflict preemption is a substitute for express congressional
intent and, therefore, should be met with suspicion. The "new"
presumption against preemption operates as a fundamental analytical
backdrop, particularly in implied conflict preemption cases, to insure that
traditionally operating state law is appropriately preserved. Conflict
preemption analysis, either impossibility or obstacle, should maintain a
laser-like focus on only those federal statutory objectives, or federal
regulatory actions, with which state law purportedly conflicts. The line-
drawing that creates a preemptive conflict must be precise. The Court's
preemption doctrine demands it.
May 2olo] 1255
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL1256 [Vol. 61:1217
